{"id":1436,"date":"2024-09-29T11:58:17","date_gmt":"2024-09-29T14:58:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/regulacionconvergente.com\/?p=1436"},"modified":"2025-01-07T12:37:06","modified_gmt":"2025-01-07T15:37:06","slug":"una-nueva-ley-general-de-telecomunicaciones-o-mejor-una-ley-y-una-nueva-institucionalidad-de-regulacion-convergente","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/regulacionconvergente.com\/english\/2024\/09\/29\/una-nueva-ley-general-de-telecomunicaciones-o-mejor-una-ley-y-una-nueva-institucionalidad-de-regulacion-convergente\/","title":{"rendered":"A New General Telecommunications Law, or Rather a Convergent Regulation Law (and a New Institutionalism)?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Estas \u00faltimas semanas distintos medios especializados han se\u00f1alado que el subsecretario de Telecomunicaciones ha anunciado la presentaci\u00f3n de un proyecto de ley general de telecomunicaciones para Chile (1<\/span><\/a>)(2<\/span><\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although the scope of the announcement is unclear, it is relevant to remember that the current law is over 40 years old and the challenges of the present-future exceed telecommunications and radio-television in the traditional sense.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

If this were to be the scenario, this is an opportunity to move toward a convergent regulation of communications, as many other countries in the region and internationally have done, with the resulting adjustment at an institutional level. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This announcement is related to the debate occurred between 2011 and 2014 regarding a bill for a Superintendence of Telecommunications submitted in the first administration of Sebasti\u00e1n Pi\u00f1era. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It was a proposal with a convergent understanding of telecommunications, yet insufficient for several reasons, including the fact that its main focus of interest was to separate the functions of the Telecommunications Undersecretariat (SUBTEL)<\/a><\/span>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

El mensaje presidencial que acompa\u00f1\u00f3 el env\u00edo de ese proyecto de ley dec\u00eda: \u201cNo parece correcto que quien dicta las normas sea el mismo que las fiscaliza y sanciona\u201d; y al mismo tiempo, buscaba reducir \u201cel riesgo de ese fen\u00f3meno que se conoce como \u2018captura del regulador\u2019\u201d, un concepto acu\u00f1ado en los \u201870 por el Nobel de Econom\u00eda George Stigler.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ten years later, the debate on institutionalism has become more complex due to the development of technology convergence and the challenges it entails. For this reason, any changes to the legal framework of telecommunications cannot disregard this reality. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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En nuestro proyecto de #regulacionconvergente estamos observando distintos ejemplos de articulaci\u00f3n institucional que combinan de distinta manera la relaci\u00f3n entre telecomunicaciones, radio, televisi\u00f3n y servicios digitales, tanto en el \u00e1mbito latinoamericano como anglosaj\u00f3n y europeo.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

From the perspective of the regulated industries, a concept that binds together a significant portion of the debate is \u201cregulatory asymmetry\u201d. In general, it relates to the traditional audiovisual sector, considered to be overregulated and at a disadvantage regarding other industries such as streaming platforms. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, our research suggests that although there is only one techno-media convergence, at least three sectors coexist within it (telecommunications, audiovisual and digital services in the communications sector), that they are all different, and that the main risk in terms of convergent regulation is that it will be general yet light for all and the logics of telecommunications will end up absorbing the specificity of the other industries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Our approach is to rather develop an asymmetric yet fair regulation in the sense that it identifies the specificities for each technological medium, including obligations regarding the contents and the business model. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

We think that a good regulation for the convergent scenario must be specific, tending to the characteristics of each sector while also understanding that they share common aspects because of the convergence. However, in no case does this entail requiring equal responsibilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Based on the research we are conducting as Fondecyt Project 1230748,<\/a><\/span> we would like to raise other aspects of the discussion in the public space, related particularly to the autonomy and independence of the institutionalism in charge of enforcing the sector\u2019s regulation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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  1. A collegiate body in charge of enforcing regulation with multi-comprehensive selection and governance criteria<\/strong>. The importance of having good and diverse professional profiles not only limited to engineers and lawyers by means of combined recruitment and appointment systems. More effective autonomy of the body by means of a distribution of the selection power among several actors, not only the legislative and executive power as has been the trend so far in organizations like the CNTV or TVN. <\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. Interinstitutional coordination<\/strong>. Techno-media convergence is permanently leading to new regulatory challenges. This year, Chile passed the personal data law and the cybersecurity policy, which involve the creation of new autonomous bodies. These areas of public intervention overlap in some points with the regulatory institutionalism of communications. That is why formal coordination between them is important. <\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. Preventing corporate regulatory capture<\/strong>. En este punto se requieren medidas m\u00e1s estrictas para evitar la puerta giratoria entre instituciones reguladoras y empresas reguladas. Considerando periodos m\u00e1s extensos de prohibici\u00f3n para pasar de un sector a otro hasta un mejor apoyo desde el Estado a los funcionarios que dejan su funci\u00f3n p\u00fablica al cumplir sus periodos. A modo de comparaci\u00f3n, en el caso del CNTV esta prohibici\u00f3n es de 6 meses, mientras que en el caso de ARCOM, el regulador convergente franc\u00e9s, la prohibici\u00f3n es de 3 a\u00f1os.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  4. Binding citizen participation<\/strong>. Formal and effective institutional mechanisms are required that guarantee the presence and participation of non-profit civil society associations in the decisions made by the regulator. <\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    By Chiara S\u00e1ez, September 2024<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Listen to this editorial below (in spanish):<\/p>\n\n\n\n